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The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line—the relation of the darker to the 
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.  
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903)  
 
He was getting tired of Negroes and their rights. It was a miserable recognition, and on many a count, for 
if he felt even a hint this way, then what immeasurable tides of rage must be loose in America itself?  
Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of Chicago (1968)  
Jesse Jackson's bid for the Democratic nomination constituted the most important challenge 
to the American left since the emergence of the civil rights movement in the fifties and the feminist 
movement in the seventies. Unfortunately, the American left, for the most part, missed this grand 
opportunity. In this essay, I will argue that this failure to respond in a serious and sustained manner 
to the contemporary black political upsurge signifies the need for a reassessment and reconstruction 
of the American left—a rearticulation of progressive forces centered on anti-imperialist struggles 
(against U.S. and Soviet forms) and black unity (a unity open to non-black allies yet subordinate to 
no non-black groups).  
Setting the American Stage  
The basic thesis of my argument should be viewed as neither apocalyptic nor alarming; it 
simply confronts the complex and contradictory nature of progressive forces in this country. These 
forces are complex and contradictory primarily because of the distinct American terrain upon which 
they reside. The American left has been shaped by the dynamic yet persistant features of American 
life—features that have imposed constraints upon the left's ability to flourish. The most crucial brute 
fact about the American terrain is that the USA began as a liberal capitalist nation permeated with 
patriarchal oppression and based, in large part, upon a slave economy. These beginnings facilitated 
the ideological predominance of an American-style liberalism which, on the one hand, promoted the 
sanctity of private property, the virtue of capital accumulation and the subordination of women and, 
on the other hand, encouraged the flowering of a slave-based society principally upon the ideological 
pillar of the inferiority of noneuropeans, especially Africans. This native form of liberalism was 
engendered not by opposition to feudalism as in Europe but rather by securing property-owning 
white male consensus in order to maintain social stability. Motivated by notions of new beginnings, 
edenic innocence and exemplary performance, the anti-colonial sentiments of the nation entailed an 
abiding distrust of institutional power, bureaucracy and, above all, the state. Despite unprecedented 
proliferation of voluntary associations, American political discourse placed great emphasis on the 
welfare of propertied persons as atomistic individuals rather than as community dwellers or citizens 
of a republic.  
This liberal ideology of Americanism embodied the ideals of bourgeois freedom (such as the 
freedom to own property, accumulate capital, speak one's mind and organize to worship) and formal 
equality (equal treatment under the law)—circumscribed by racist and sexist constraints. These 
ideological origins indeed have undergone change and transformation over time, yet their traces 
strongly persist in contemporary American political culture and ideology. To put it crudely, most 
Americans even now-be they of the right of the left-are highly individualistic, libertarian, anti-statist 
as well as racist and sexist.  
The infamous "gift of suffrage" to the white male component of the working class without 
the need for organized proletarian organization—in fact prior to widespread industrialization hence 
substantive industrial class formation—yielded deep allegiance of the white male populace to the 
existing political order. This political arrangement of coalitional politics and political machines 
within the framework of a two-party system channeled organizational efforts of class, race and 
gender into practical interest group struggles and thereby relegated oppositional movements to either 
ill-fated third parties or political oblivion. Furthermore, harsh state repression has been exercised 
against perceived extremists who threaten the tenuous consensus which the liberal ideology of 
Americanism reinforces. This ingenious political setup encourages diverse modes of interest group 
articulation and permits incremental social change; it also domesticates oppositional movements, 
dilutes credible wholesale programs of social change and discourages sustained organizational efforts 
at undermining the liberal consensus. The political predicament of the American left has been and 
remains that of ideological purity and political irrelevance or ideological compromise and political 
marginality.  
Extraordinary American productivity principally owing to tremendous technological 
innovation (motivated, in part, by labor shortages), abundant natural resources (secured by 
imperialist domination of indigenous peoples) and cheap labor (usually imported from various parts 
of the globe) has enabled social upward mobility unknown in the modern world. The availability of 
goods, luxuries and conveniences which has made comfort an American obsession—to significant 
segments of the population gives the appearance of a widely fluid social structure. This perception 
provides credence to the Horatio Alger dimension of the liberal ideology of Americanism: the 
possibility of rags-to-riches success for all. Even the lower classes remain enchanted by this seductive 
ideological drama.  
High levels of productivity, with uneven expressions across various regions of the country, 
have made the commitment to economic growth an unquestioned national dogma. From the far 
right (for whom growth is a symptom of liberty) to the sophisticated left (for whom growth makes 
easier redistribution), Americans remain captive to the notion of economic expansion. This dogma 
undergirds the consensus of American-style liberalism and thereby views as natural necessity the close 
partnership of the state, banks and large corporations and their coordinated expansionist activities 
abroad—with often repressive consequences for the native populations. This partnership, along with 
its imperialist extension, is the linchpin of the American terrain.  
Historical Components of the American Left 
The American left consists of those indigenous social movements—and the sensibilities, 
values and viewpoints generated by them—which call into question and seek to undermine the 
consensus of the liberal ideology of Americanism on behalf of the disenfranchised and 
disadvantaged. In the American past, seven social forces constitute the most salient and sustained 
forms of such opposition: civic republicanism, populism, trade-unionism, communitarianism, 
feminism, socialism (which includes communism and anarchism) and black radicalism. By 
highlighting these seven expressions of the American left, I do not deny the significance of other 
expressions: such as Latino, Native American, Asian, gay, lesbian, peace or ecological oppositional 
movements. I am simply suggesting that these latter forms of the American left have not played as 
central a role as have the seven forms I will examine. The present picture indeed is rapidly changing. 
But my aim in this section is to scrutinize briefly the major historical modes of the American left, 
with an eye toward their capacity (or incapacity) for reactivation and rearticulation. My historicist 
bias here assumes that we can more fully grasp the significance of "new" social movements when we 
have reassessed the roles played by the older ones. Civic republicanism is often overlooked as a 
progressive social force in American history, though able leftist proponents such as Robert Bellah 
and Sheldon Wolin keep us mindful of it. This noteworthy discourse, which for some time has 
lacked an immediate constituency, puts forward a grand vision of a virtuous and participatory 
citizenry within a democratic nation with broad economic equality and decentralized political 
authority. Its Jeffersonian and Jacksonian versions once seized the imagination of urban artisans, 
agricultural entrepreneurs and anti-bourgeois (as opposed to anti-capitalist) intellectuals. Civic 
republicanism is important not as a social movement but as a social force in the form of a political 
discourse. It is crucial because it plays a formative role in the history of American progressive 
political language. Civic republicanism has shaped perceptions, attitudes, habits, hence political 
praxis of American opositional movements, from populism to black radicalism. This is so primarily 
because civic republicanism served as one of the ideological pillars of the country's first collective 
definition, its initial national self-understanding.  
This originary American ideology projects a noble ideal of citizens' participation in the 
decision-making processes of the institutions which guide and regulate their lives—unencumbered 
by mystifying forms of mediation such as manipulative political parties, relatively empty periodic 
rituals of passive voting and alienating centralized bureaucracies. Civic republicanism can be 
construed as an American-style revolt against the modern industrial order; its more vulgar versions 
succumb to romantic nostalgia for a mythical democratic Gemeinschaft or egalitarian Greek polis. In 
its more refined forms, civic republicanism generates powerful critiques of industrial capitalism (and 
communism) and persuasive defenses of democratic modes of economic, political and cultural life. 
Such critiques and defenses invoke memories and distant echoes in American life, yet they seldom, if 
ever, surface in a potent organizational form. In this regard, civic republicanism is a political 
anachronism with little capacity to create or sustain a social movement. Yet, as a political discourse 
with deep roots in American history, it contains precious values, insights and visions indispensable 
for any acceptable leftist movement.  
In stark contrast to civic republicanism, populism has been a potent and powerful progressive 
force in American history. Yet it has rarely sustained a movement over a decade. Populism initially 
was the political ideology of principally immiserated yeoman farmers (fearing social slippage into 
tenantry), exploited tenant laborers (in quest of becoming yeoman farmers) and irate marginal 
industrial workers in staunch opposition to capitalist control of land and crops—especially the crop 
lien system which rendered farmers and intermittent laborers perennially indebted to merchant 
bankers. Populist ideology, drawing freely from civic republican discourse, promoted oppositional 
institution-building in which the ideals of community and cooperative relations were paramount. It 
accented local control of banks, decentralized economic relations, small-scale political institutions, 
limited property ownership and intimate social interaction. Unlike civic republicanism, populism 
constituted organizational forms which reached its peak in the South-wide Alliance struggle of the 
1880s and its outgrowth, the People's Party of the 1890s. Like civic republicanism, populism is 
difficult to understand in terms of traditional 20th-century leftist categories. It indeed was neither 
anti-capitalist nor revolutionary. But it presented a serious challenge to the existing order. Populism 
resurged in more diluted and desperate forms in Huey Long's Share Our Wealth Plan and, to a 
degree, in Father Coughlin's National Union For Social Justice during the Great Depression. Again 
the central foe was a process of centralization which rendered local communities and persons 
economically dependent (and socially stationary) on impersonal, bureaucratic forms of capital. For 
example, processes of modern merchandizing such as the chain store and mail-order house that 
pushed out local merchants invoked venom from such 20th-century populists. Different from earlier 
populism, Long and Coughlin neither engaged in serious institution-building nor sustained local 
control efforts. Instead, they appealed to the federal government to enact and enforce policies against 
centralized capital. Such feeble gestures to federal power already in relative cooperation with banks 
and large corporations signified the degree to which populism had lost its substance and vision—and 
soon to become a mere interest group within the Democratic Party. Antiquated avatars of populism 
limp on in our own time invoking pastoral visions of localized arrangements or projecting 
"traditional" values of bygone communities without probing into their repressive effects. Needless to 
say, the Achilles heel of populism was its xenophobia and isolationism: after early efforts at 
interracial solidarity, both 19th and 20th-century populism has been viciously racist and pro-
imperialist. Yet, it contains elements which should be integral to any acceptable leftist movement: 
local activism, politics of everyday life of ordinary people and discernible forms of peoples' 
empowerment.  
American trade-unionism has a distinguished though deeply flawed history. Reflecting more 
a craft than class consciousness, with the great exception of The Knights of Labor between 1869 and 
1887, the trade-union movement has consistently missed grand opportunities primarily due to its 
captivity to racism. More than civic republicanism and even populism, the organized efforts of the 
working class in this country have faltered at the altar of exclusion of and indifference to black, 
yellow, brown and red workers. And though the gallant struggles of racist white workers have 
contributed to progressive policies and legislation, the trade-union movement has been as much self-
limited as delimited by hostile social forces.  
Trade-unionism reached its peak with the infusion of white industrial and unskilled laborers 
and workers of color in the thirties and forties (the years of the grand CIO) promoted by inspired 
communists, socialists and black activists. This peak quickly slid back into a cold war plateau and 
recently has slid further to an unfortunate nadir. With its close ties to cold war foreign policies, its 
racist legacy, and its myopic top-down bureaucratic leadership and operations up against widespread 
deindustrialization and tough anti-labor policies of a conservative administration—the future of 
trade-unionism looks bleak. This perception results, in part, from leftist expectations of the trade-
union movement (often guided by Marxist hopes) which tend to be exorbitant. No movement can 
be measured by the standards of Logos. But most signs indicate that the movement lacks the 
imagination and will to response to the present conservative assault. I would go as far as to suggest 
that it is principally the tireless progressive warriors of a past era and the fresh new minority and 
women workers who sustain and give life to the movement today. How long this will keep it going 
remains an open question. Can there be a substantive American left without a vital trade-union 
movement? Yes, but it would be extremely difficult.  
Communitarianism is an American form of utopian radicalism which is unabashedly proud 
of its utopianism. In the face of a left influenced by Marx's anti-utopianism, some American radicals, 
acting upon a deep voluntaristic impulse in American culture, have periodically and persistently 
attempted to build their own communities of peace, justice and freedom. The significance of these 
movements is not their failure but their motivation for trying to succeed against such overwhelming 
odds. The basic motivation is a profound pessimism regarding the fundamental transformation of 
American society. In this regard, communitarianism has served as a principled though desperate 
alternative to opportunistic sellout to a seductive Americanism after realizing that revolution is a 
long process, not an imminent event. Like all encapsulating practices, it presupposes ideological and 
cultural homogeneity—and usually some degree of luxury. The very act of choosing to subversively 
cop-out of mainstream society often means that neither oppressive social circumstances nor limited 
economic opportunities forced one to tragically cop-out (as with many underclass youth). 
Communitarianism is the agonized conscience of American radicalism. When all is well it wanes, but 
since all is never really well, it persists (in various forms) keeping radicals honest.  
Feminism is the most impressive contemporary movement in America. Historically rooted in 
the 19th-century abolitionist movement, independent and autonomous up to the acquisition of 
voting rights in the early twenties and surfacing again with fervor and ferment in the late sixties and 
seventies, feminism (understood as the multi-dimensional struggle against sexual discrimination and 
gender oppression and for women's freedom) constitutes the most vibrant form of American 
radicalism on the present scene. This is so, in part, because highly politicized white middle class 
women in the aftermath of the civil rights movement made sexual inequality a national issue. They 
were able to do this primarily because black inequality (after much struggle, bloodshed and many 
deaths) had become a legitimated national issue. And by comparing and relating sexual oppression to 
black oppression, the women's movement could more easily move toward national attention. Let me 
hastily add, I do not object to such a procedure of legitimation. But it certainly lends itself to vulgar 
displacement of black concerns to white middle class women concerns by the powers that be. Of 
course, liberal versions of feminism became the major focus. Yet, dialogues and struggles with black, 
brown, yellow and red feminists as well as the emergence of organized lesbians have moved even 
liberal feminists to new heights.  
The progressive appeal of feminism at the moment is its ability to show how power relations 
permeate the most taken-for-granted (or "natural") everyday language, mores and folkways. For 
many white middle strata people-relatively unacquainted with self-perceptions of victimization—
these revelations of subordination are deeply transformative. Therefore, feminism has been able to 
articulate a politics of culture which often eventuates in new agents against sexist oppression. Like 
the populism of old, contemporary feminism has initiated a process of building an oppositional 
culture which puts pressures on public discourse and practices, thereby enlarging discursive 
boundaries and political perimeters. These oppositional cultural efforts may stand at a distance (as 
with socialist feminists) or within (as with liberal feminists) the higher echelons of power. And as the 
presence and influence of womanists of color escalates, American feminism could nearly set the 
terms for the future of the American left.  
Socialism, including communism and anarchism, are not "indigenous" forms of radicalism 
in the way earlier ones are. There is indeed an indigenous tradition of socialism, communism and 
anarchism in America, but the discourses themselves did not take deep roots here. They are often 
viewed as European imports—examples of travelling theories and ideologies which gained the 
attention of significant sections of the secular American left. Anarchism, with its stress on 
libertarianism and anti-statism, is the most amenable of European progressive ideologies to American 
political culture, but ironically, it has been the least attractive of such ideologies. Socialism became a 
substantive American possession only after it was buttressed by ex-Populist support in the Southwest 
and infused with evangelical fervor by Midwest proletarians and Northeast immigrant Jews. The 
socialist movement, led by Eugene Debs, in the first decade or so of this century was a noteworthy 
force in American life. Though unable to compete with urban immigrant political machines, 
unwilling to recruit seriously people of color and crushed by the Palmer Raids and other such acts of 
state repression, the socialist movement introduced the Marxist notions of class struggle and 
international solidarity to American political culture—a culture of clashing political factions and 
interest groups after short-term material gain and social status.  
The collapse of the American socialist movement was not August 1914 as in Europe but 
October 1917. It never recovered after the Bolshevik Revolution. With much justification, American 
socialism has neither forgotten nor forgivenLenin and Trotsky for traducing the democratic ideals of 
socialism. And, again with much justification, fierce opposition to Stalin became a litmus test for any 
recognizable socialist. Yet, in regard to organization, the red torch passed from the Socialist Party to 
the Communist Party after 1921. And the socialist movement did not recuperate until 1982, with 
the coming together of democratic socialists, social democrats, pragmatic progressives and cultural 
leftists to form DSA (Democratic Socialists of America).  
Communism was an alien ideology to Americans not only because Marxist terminology had 
to travel from Europe, but also because Soviet orders had to travel from Russia. This terminology 
and these orders did not deter thousands of young idealistic students, dedicated second-generation 
immigrant workers and, for the first time in American radicalism, significant numbers of black 
urban dwellers. The central appeal to black people-the call for black national self-determination-
catered to black nationalist sentiments enacted by the Garvey movement in the early twenties. This 
appeal resulted in the most racially integrated organization in the country. In this regard, the 
communist movement created and sustained the only American oppositional culture (with a white 
majority) in this century which took racism seriously as a foe and enemy.  
As noted earlier, the Communist Party pushed the trade-union movement in an 
unprecendented manner in the thirties. The Party underwent persecution and self-destruction in the 
forties and had nearly collapsed by the early sixties. It benefitted from the turn to orthodox 
Marxisms after the demise of the New Left in the late sixties and seventies, and presently persists as 
radical fire under urban reform and trade union activism-while their treacherous link to the Soviet 
Union remains intact.  
At last, we come to black radicalism, in its integrationist and nationalist forms. Black 
radicalism is the oldest form of American radicalism. In fact, like the revolts of indigenous peoples, it 
predates America itself. The unique burden of black radicalism is that it has usually found itself 
struggling not only against racism in American society, but also against racism in American 
radicalism. Black resistance is the most "indigenous" form of American radicalism precisely because 
racism has been the most visible and vicious form of oppression in American society. This is so not 
because the genocidal attacks on indigenous peoples have been less brutal or the exploitation of 
Chinese and Latino laborers have been less harsh, but rather because systematic dehumanization of 
Africans was an economic necessity and ideological pillar for those who founded the nation. Africans 
were an integral—in some ways the most important—component in the actual operations of 
American society. And in the American psyche, Africans have been and remain literal victims and 
metaphorical symbols of oppression within American society.  
Black radicalism is a product of a distinct culture of survival and sustenance. Bred in a 
unique black Christian culture, it is moralistic in motivation yet often opportunistic in practice. Its 
mode of leadership is inveterately charismatic, and usually messianic. Its protean and improvisational 
efforts to promote black dignity and secure black progress makes it suspicious of Euro-American 
"isms," be they of the right or the left. But consistent moral action and political loyalty by others 
produces genuine black acceptance and allegiance.  
Black radicalism has not been as it could be precisely because other forms of American 
radicalism have not been radical enough-radical enough to embrace black people as equals in their 
ranks. Black integrationism (as opposed to black assimilationism) has continually attempted to fuse 
with other forms of American radicalism, but rarely has it been welcome. Black nationalism (as 
opposed to black separatism) resulted from a recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of Afro- 
Americans conjoined with the brutal lessons of white exclusion; it feeds on a healthy pessimism 
regarding the possibilites of black freedom in racist white America. Like the religious culture from 
which it flows, black radicalism hopes against hope if only to hold out the dream of freedom in a 
never-never land (be it American society for integrationists or a black nation for nationalists) in order 
to survive in the deplorable present.  
Black integrationism is often viewed as more realistic and practical than black nationalism. 
Yet, opportunism—unprincipled scrambling for crumbs—is usually the result for both forms. The 
oscillation between deep moralism, inescapable opportunism and aggressive pessimism is found in 
the exemplary careers of major black figures: the political shifts of Frederick Douglass from 
revolutionary to U.S. Ambassador, the patronage bargains of Booker T. Washington who was a 
Knight of Labor before it opted for black deportation to Liberia, the long and winding maneuvers of 
W.E.B. Du Bois whose faith in America faded from decade to decade until only Nkrumah's Ghana 
could hold his spirit, the resoluted quest for black dignity at any cost of Marcus Garvey and the 
bitter perception of American "sickness" by Martin Luther King, Jr. at the end of his life. After 
protracted struggle, all recognized that there could be no serious American left without a vital black 
radicalism, yet the American left shunned black radicalism when such radicalism was expressed in 
self-defining terms.  
The Challenge of the Jackson Campaign  
The Jackson intervention into American left practices epitomizes the imposed isolation of 
black radicalism. Even in a period of immense national and international crisis, this isolation persists. 
In the midst of militaristic policies abroad and domestic efforts to decrease transfer payments to the 
needy, diminish public worker protection, erode unemployment compensation, dilute 
environmental regulation, expand low wage markets and augment incentives and abatements to 
corporations and firms, the American left continues to hold black radicalism at arm's length. This is 
seen most clearly in the Jackson campaign. There is no doubt that the Jackson campaign is unique in 
American and Afro-American history. He is neither the first black person to run for the Presidency 
nor the first to have influence on the leadership of the Democratic Party. But he is the first serious 
black candidate for President to seize the imagination of the masses of black people (with over 20% 
of black voters casting ballots for the first time) and make some inroads among Latinos, Asians, 
Native Americans and whites.  
Jesse Jackson and Black Politics  
The significance of the Jackson campaign is best understood in light of the history of black 
politics in 20th-century America. Most black people entered this century deprived of formal political 
rights, including the right to vote and hold political office. Legalized exclusion from the political 
process in the predominantly rural American South—where over 90% of black people lived in 
1900—ensured black political powerlessness. Those few black people in the urban American north 
had limited access to political participation owing to the gerrymandering of black districts which 
diffused and disarmed black political power.  
The first milestones in black politics in this century were the elections of two black men to 
Congress: Chicago's Oscar DePriest in 1928 and New York's Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. in 1944. 
DePriest's election resulted from white political patronage: a ten year process of black inclusion in 
William Thompson's Republican city machine. Powell's victory rested upon independent black 
political organization: a militant church-based mobilization in Harlem. The mantle of the 
Republican DePriest was passed to Arthur Mitchell (a Republican turned Democrat) in 1934 and 
then to Democrat William Dawson from 1942 to 1971. Powell remained in office until 1970. The 
low-keyed, pragmatic style of Dawson and the audacious, aggressive style of Powell dominated the 
first stage of black politics in this century.  
With the limited but unprecedented success of the civil rights movement, substantive racist 
barriers for black political participation were removed. And black political presence grew principally 
in the form of mayors in crucial urban centers, officials on the local and state levels and members of 
Congress. This second stage of black politics spawned the creation of a black political class: a 
heterogeneous group of black elected officials who constituted the political elite of the black 
community. Riding the crest of black group consciousness generated by the Black Power movement 
in the late sixties, most of these politicians ingeniously seized this opportunity to consolidate black 
participation in electoral politics. Soon major cities such as Cleveland, Newark, Detroit, Gary and 
later Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago, Birmingham and Philadelphia had black mayors. And the Black 
Congressional Caucus had grown to seventeen. Presently, this black political class -along with the 
heads of the traditional civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference—comprise the major leadership in black America.  
The Jackson candidacy for the Democratic nomination goes far beyond the political 
patronage of DePriest and Dawson, the flamboyant flair of Powell and the cautious maneuvers of the 
new black political class. Yet, elements of this past haunt Jackson's efforts. His monumental 
campaign is bold, fearless and daring. Yet its practical success still depends on its capacity to broker 
with Democratic Party elites. The challenge remains for Jackson to translate an exciting and 
captivating campaign into concrete political payoff and to sustain the movement quality of this 
momentum after the November elections.  
This challenge primarily consists of building an organization to sustain Jackson's black-
dominated "rainbow" coalition. Such a task will be difficult owing to three basic reasons. First, 
Jackson's charismatic style of leadership accentuates spontane ous and enthusiastic attraction at the 
expense of creating enduring infrastructures. Second, Jackson's most loyal constituency—the black 
community and especially black churches—presently seems to lack the patience, resources and 
ideological wherewithal to engage in prolonged political organization. And lastly, black—and to a 
certain extent, Jackson's—allegiance to the Democratic Party diffuses energies which could be 
directed toward alternative political mobilization.  
No one predicted the extent to which Jackson's campaign would electrify and energize black 
Americans—and provide an alternative to some nonblack Americans. He has received an astounding 
20% of the popular vote in the Democratic primaries—including 25.5% of the vote in New York, 
23% in New Jersey, 21% in Georgia, 20.8% in Illinois, 19.4% in Alabama, and 17% in 
Pennsylvania. He won the primaries in Louisiana and Washington, D.C., and the caucus voting in 
South Carolina and Virginia. Jackson's vote-getting power among blacks has been phenomenal: 89% 
of the black vote in New York, 75% in New Jersey, 70% in Georgia, 74% in Illinois, 60% in 
Alabama and 74% in Pennsylvania. And though his support among nonblack voters has not been 
insignificant—he was preferred by 33% of Latinos in New York, for example—it has not been 
overly impressive.  
The Jackson campaign has reached such surprising heights, in part, because his social 
democratic program occupies progressive space abandoned by the moderate agendas of the two 
front-runners, Walter Mondale and Gary Hart. The agendas of both Mondale and Hart are 
anchored in the neo-liberalism of social theorists like Robert Reich, Felix Rohatyn and Ira 
Magaziner: this neo-liberalism calls for modernizing industry, promoting high technology and 
retraining workers in order to compete on the international market, while making symbolic gestures 
toward issues of social justice and environmental protection. Jackson's program, echoed earlier in the 
progressive stance of candidate George McGovern, is influenced by the social democratic thought of 
Ronald Walters, Robert Brown, and Tom Hayden. It aims to increase regulation and taxation of 
huge corporations, make vast cuts in the military budget, expand educational and service programs 
for the poor, and revamp U.S. foreign policies toward Europe, Japan, and especially toward Third 
World nations. Beneath the poignant rhetoric of black pride and empowerment of the excluded, 
Jackson's agenda consists of updating New Deal programs under post-industrial capitalist 
conditions. His basic aim is to revive the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.  
Jackson's controversial positions on U.S. foreign policies have made it difficult to achieve this 
aim. By refusing to succumb to the knee-jerk anti-communism which has regulated political 
discourse on foreign affairs in the U.S. since World War II, he has posed a major challenge to the 
Democratic Party. Jackson has persistently highlighted the plight of black South Africans under the 
apartheid Botha regime, a scandal given but slight attention by the Democratic Party. He has openly 
sided with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, supported negotiations with the so-called rebels in El 
Salvador, and condemned the Marcos government in the Philippines—and has been politely 
shunned by the Democratic Party. Most importantly, Jackson has called for a redirection of Middle 
East policy that would recognize the interests of Arab nations and acknowledge the deplorable 
situation of Palestinians inside Israel and in the occupied territories.  
This courageous move to interrogate U.S. Middle East policies has been the novel issue in 
the Jackson campaign. For decades it has been difficult to discuss Middle East policy on its merits, 
and not least among Democratic Party leaders. The party relies on Jews for ideas, leadership, and 
money. Unquestioning support of Israel has been a source of personal identity for many in the 
American Jewish community, it is a secular substitute for Judaism—resulting, at times, in 
chauvinistic viewpoints. Such automatic solidarity may be diminishing. Both in the U.S. and Israel, 
and even among many who consider themselves Zionists, unwavering U.S. deference to Israeli policy 
is being questioned as a disservice to Israel as well as this country. To some Jews as well as others, 
what Jackson had to say at the policy level made better sense than the fawning appeal made by 
Walter Mondale and Gary Hart with their promise to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem.  
But Jackson muddied the waters badly by his inexcusably crude references to Jews ("Hymie" 
and "Hymietown"). His supporter, Minister Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam, made matters 
worse by his description of Hitler as "wickedly great," his threats of violence against black "traitors," 
and his despicable characterization of Judaism as a "dirty" (or "gutter") religion. Given the history of 
anti-Semitism and the reality of its latent power for evil, these incidents alienated even some highly 
progressive Jews (including those in socialist organizations such as DSA), and they were exploited to 
the hilt by spokespersons for the Jewish establishment and by some passionately pro-Israeli 
publications like The New Republic.  
From a black perspective, Louis Farrakhan's threatening demeanor and wild words hold less 
longterm significance than his decision to lead the Nation of Islam away from separatism into the 
electoral process. Jackson's use of "Hymie" was a holdover from ghetto talk, deeply offensive outside 
that context, not necessarily so within. Researchers into Jackson's past have come up with a handful 
of quotations that are employed as proof of anti-Semitism. Most are simply realistic assessments of 
the inequalities built into the black-Jewish alliance on civil rights issues; perhaps one or two are 
troubling with hints of anti-Semitic residues in his language, but even these are cited out of context. 
In sum, the evidence hardly warrants the charge. But, as Jackson is not the first to discover, the label 
of staunch anti-Semite attaches very readily to anyone seriously critical of Israel.  
A further factor helping to explain the tendentious critiques of Jackson is the transformation 
of numerous middle-class liberal Jewish voters into moderate and even conservative elements within 
both major parties. Quite apart from his specific challenges to Middle East policy, Jackson's efforts 
to forge a progressive "rainbow coalition" accenting the needs of the poor and new foreign policies 
favoring the third world have prompted negative responses among those, including Jews, who once 
led the old liberal coalition. 
Both now and in the future, this complex situation represents a serious problem for Jackson. 
Open debate of Middle East policy is important to world peace as well as to U.S. and Israeli agendas, 
but anyone who wants to challenge past policies from within the political mainstream risks being 
pushed into political oblivion. The success of Jackson's effort to reconstitute the progressive wing of 
the Democratic Party may well turn on his ability to campaign visibly and credibly against anti-
Semitism while continuing to address Middle East questions with candor. Given the explosive power 
of the Middle East in American politics, what Jackson does or fails to do in this respect may spell 
doom or triumph for the social democratic agenda in the Democratic Party.  
The second reason Jackson's campaign has attained such surprising heights is that it emerged 
just as the black freedom movement reached its nadir. This movement faltered badly in the seventies 
principally owing to the reversion of the black left to antiquated forms of orthodox Marxism in the 
face of the consolidation of the petit bourgeois black political class. Needless to say, this reversion 
further distanced the black left from the mainstream of the black community. This encapsulating 
reversion can be primarily accounted for by the exorbitant and excessive hopes invested in black 
nationalist ideology by the black left in the late sixties and early seventies. Soon it became apparent 
that this ideology primarily advanced the emergence and development of the black political class—
with minimal results for the black poor. The black left adopted crude Marxist rhetorics devoid of 
effective strategies and tactics.  
In 1980, two significant efforts were made to bring together black leftist forces: the founding 
of the National Black United Front (headed by the Rev. Herbert Daughtry) and the National Black 
Independent Political Party, led by the Rev. Ben Chavis. Groups have had trouble sustaining 
themselves, though at present the former remains much more potent than the latter. Jackson's 
candidacy provided an ideal terrain of serious political engagement for both groups. The refusal of 
major figures of the black political class-notably Mayor Andrew Young of Atlanta, Richard 
Arrington of Birmingham, Coleman Young of Detroit, Wilson Goode of Philadelphia, Congressman 
Charles Rangel (Powell's successor) of New York and State Representative Julian Bond of Georgia—
to support Jackson's candidacy ensured the attraction of more radical forces to Jackson and his own 
attention to their progressive perspectives. In addition to the more leftist-oriented members of the 
black political class who encouraged Jackson to run for office (persons like Congressmen Ronald 
Dellums and John Conyers), Jackson openly courted and won the support of the leaders of both 
black leftist groups; both Daughtry and Chavis have played highly visible and substantial roles in 
Jackson's campaign.  
It is important to note that Jackson's vocation as a black Christian Baptist preacher endeared 
him to many grassroots Afro-Americans. A near majority of black Americans are Christians and most 
black Christians are of the Baptist denomination. The National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc.—led 
by the Rev. T.J. Jemison—is the largest black group in the country, with over seven million 
members, so that Jemison's endorsement of Jackson was noteworthy. Furthermore, most black 
clergypersons and laity supported Jackson, often permitting their churches to be used for rallies, 
meeting places and sites for voter registration. As already noted, even the legendary Black Muslims, 
encouraged by Farrakhan, broke with tradition and voted for Jackson.  
The Jackson campaign has brought together the broadest united front in black America since 
the days of the great Martin Luther King, Jr. This display of black unity has been incredible and 
impressive-and has had an immeasurable symbolic effect on black Americans, especially poor black 
Americans. For example, this past April in New York City's Harlem, there took place one of the 
largest rallies ever held in this famous district. Speakers included a socialist like myself, a Marxist- 
Leninist like the poet and playwright Amiri Baraka, leading black clergypersons, local black 
politicians, Herbert Daughtry, Indian leaders, Latino and Asian figures, white religionists, ecologists, 
and peace activists and two courageous Jewish spokesmen. And, on election day in Harlem, some 
black people -many voting for the first time-were seen dancing in the streets.  
Most black people did not expect Jackson to win the presidential nomination of the 
Democratic Party. In a recent poll, only 16% of black Americans voted with such expectation. 
Rather, black people sense in the Jackson campaign a black America coming-of-age-a prideful flexing 
of black political muscle and a bold entrance onto the national and international political scene. In 
this regard, the Jackson candidacy is more a crusade of existential assertion and political unity than a 
campaign for party nomination and national office.  
The Jackson campaign—with little money, no television advertisements and few radio 
announcements—will be the most memorable feature of the quest for the 1984 Democratic Party 
nomination. It has been a protracted struggle which magnificently mobilized the black community 
and some others around electoral politics, inadvertently polarized black and Jewish Americans, and 
tried to resuscitate the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Jackson's fiery moralistic rhetoric 
and flashy messianic style contrasted sharply with the glib discourses and bland manners of his 
opponents. And his intelligent and mellow mediating role in their thirteen televised debates 
displayed a maturity and statesmanship that stunned much of white America. Like DePriest, 
Dawson, and Powell, Jackson is a trailblazer in black politics; his campaign opens new frontiers. Yet, 
unlike them, Jackson has never won an election and will not hold political office in the near future. 
Therefore, the future of Jesse Jackson remains open and the full significance of his historic campaign 
is still to be determined. But there is no doubt that black politics has reached a new stage because of 
this charismatic black Baptist preacher.  
Reconstructing the American Left  
The challenge of the Jackson campaign to the American left is twofold. First, the prominence 
of international issues, especially Africa and the Middle East, splits the left into two basic camps: 
full-fledged proponents and reticent supporters of national self-determination. The major test cases 
are Afghanistan, El Salvador, Ireland, Israel, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland and Southern Africa. 
Each case, of course, is a highly complex matter. But full-fledged proponents for self-determination 
of nations tend to oppose Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, support the democratic elements of the 
guerilla forces in El Salvador, the IRA in Ireland, the PLO in the Middle East, the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, the PLA in the Philippines, Solidarity in Poland and SWAPO and ANC in Southern 
Africa. Reticent supporters of national self-determination, on the other hand, unequivocally 
condemn Soviet interventionism in Afghanistan, support the land reform "movement" in El 
Salvador, choose no sides in Ireland, uneasily yet consistently endorse Israeli policies, equivocate on 
their support of the Sandinistas, morally oppose the Marcos regime, enthusiastically approve of 
Solidarity and, when reminded of South Africa, endorse moderate forces resisting apartheid.  
The line of demarcation here is not simply the depth and scope of opposition to U.S. and 
Soviet imperialism; it also is the degree to which one breaks with European, Soviet and American 
ethnocentrism. Those most willing to do so have been civic republicans like I.F. Stone and Sheldon 
Wolin, independent Marxists like Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, self-styled anarchists like Noam 
Chomsky and leftist people of color such as Edward Said and Randall Robinson. Most present-day 
populists, fervent feminists, utopian communitarians and bourgeois socialists have failed to raise 
their voices in this regard -they remain captive to Euro-American ethnocentrism.  
The second challenge of the Jackson campaign to the American left is the presence of relative 
black unity. Since this unity transcends class and gender in the black community, it blurs left 
perceptions. In the eyes of some white leftists, black unity flows from "right-wing" populist appeals; 
for others, it reeks of anti-whitism, anti-Semitism and some glib Third Worldism. Black unity 
indeed consists of diverse and contradictory elements.  
It is neither accusatory nor exclusivistic. Rather it is a creative response to the state of siege 
raging in working class and underclass black communities and households. Even with black petit 
bourgeois leadership, this response, for the most part, cannot but be progressive in its basic 
orientation owing to the constituency it brings together. Yet, the white leftist reactions to black unity 
efforts have rarely been salutary. And the white leftist assessments of the Jackson campaign have 
been, in the view of most black activists, highly disappointing—and revealing. The possibility for 
progressive interracial solidarity remains, yet it has been made more difficult to realize. Again select 
civic republicans, small sectors of socialists, and feminists, larger segments of the new populists and 
vast numbers of people of color positively responded to the black unity efforts enacted in the Jackson 
campaign; others of the American left were found wanting.  
The basic lesson to be learned from the Jackson campaign is the need for a reconstruction of 
the American left. Crucial to this reconstruction is the centrality of anti-imperialist and anti-racist 
sentiments. This reconstruction requires not simply that former leftists be written out of the new 
realignment of progressive forces, but also that they be viewed for what in fact they are: often 
morally right regarding the evils they oppose but not politically left in the alternatives they endorse. 
This holds especially for mainstream peace activists, establishmentarian ecologists, moderate black 
politicians, liberal feminists, social democratic cold warriors and ethnocentric bourgeois socialists. 
Opposition to militarism, environmental abuse, racism, sexism, Soviet imperialism and economic 
injustice is morally right; yet the nuclear freeze, expansion of environmental protection, black 
presence in political office, ERA, support for Sakharov (often at the expense of eliding Nelson 
Mandela of South Africa or Father de la Torres of the Philippines) and endorsement of Israel's right 
to exist are liberal, not leftist, stances. They all surely are worthy of leftist support but not as 
displacements of more progressive concerns, but rather as stepping stones to more fundamental 
issues. At the moment, the American left must sharpen its relation to left-liberalism, not because it 
no longer takes seriously precious liberal values of individual liberties, church and state separation 
and governmental checks and balances, but rather because left-liberals are unreliable allies to those 
progressives who take seriously anti-imperialist and anti-racist concerns.  
Will a realignment of the left around anti-imperialism and relative black unity lead to 
political oblivion? I think not. First, it is important to acknowledge that most of the American left is 
already politically oblivious. So the loss would not be a net loss. More pointedly, as struggles in 
Central America, the Middle East, Poland, Ireland, Latin America and South Africa intensify, crucial 
leftist choices must be made regarding these international affairs. Furthermore, the efforts for black 
unity and the political articulation of people of color in this country is now sophisticated enough to 
link its concerns with the downtrodden white working poor and the morally sensitive white middle 
class—as evidenced in the Jackson campaign. So on the domestic front political pressure is brought 
to bear on the Democratic Party to either embrace or exclude progressive forces. If it chooses the 
former, leftist possibilities loom large within the two-party system; if it chooses the latter, the only 
alternative becomes that of wholesale assault on the two-party system with the creation of a third 
political party. Most Jackson supporters, parts of the Citizens' Party, elements of DSA, unorganized 
radical intellectuals and even some pragmatic sectarians would jump at this opportunity if it could 
become a credible option.  
Are anti-imperialism and anti-racism mere outdated leftist slogans with little political 
substance and strategic effectiveness? Are these concerns antiquated expressions of a bygone modern 
era eclipsed by postmodern sentiments regarding the technological abuse of nature, the subjugation 
of women and the marginalization of gays and lesbians? If my earlier analysis of the historical 
components of the American left is anywhere near the mark, the possibilities for widespread 
domestic radicalism are highly unlikely. This means that American leftists must give first priority to 
the most explosive issues in American society, namely, the probability of U.S. participation in 
international war principally owing to imperialist policies (esp. in Central America and the Middle 
East), and the plight of the urban black and brown poor primarily due to the legacy of racism in an 
ever-changing capitalist economy. Preoccupation with legitimate postmodern emancipatory projects 
must not overlook the lingering problems of imperialist and racist oppression promoted by the 
American powers that be.  
The concrete consequences of American leftist attention to these two explosive issues are 
more intense involvement in anti-interventionist movements and more substantive support for the 
institutionalization of a progressive rainbow coalition (more than likely) outside the Democratic 
Party. Such involvement and support must surely embrace postmodern emancipatory projects. Yet, 
given the present American terrain and the deep crisis of U.S. radicalism, a mature left must first and 
foremost direct its energies toward the struggles of oppressed third world peoples and toward the 
plight of its most downtrodden domestic citizens.  
Presently, most of the American left dangles in the balance, caught between opposing a 
dangerous and conservative administration and a wavering and centrist Democratic Party. The 
challenge of the Jackson campaign is that anti-imperialist and open-ended black unity forces may set 
the terms for a realignment of progressive forces which take us far beyond the knee-jerk pessimism 
and habitual paralysis of the American Left. There are progressive possibilities beyond this 
predicament, but only a reconstructed left can fulfill them. 
   
